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Intelligent Conditional Collaborative
Private Data Sharing
Giuseppe Bianchi, Tooska Dargahi, Alberto Caponi, and Mauro Conti
Abstract With the advent of distributed systems, secure and privacy-
preserving data sharing between different entities (individuals or organiza-
tions) becomes a challenging issue. There are several real-world scenarios in
which different entities are willing to share their private data only under cer-
tain circumstances, such as sharing the system logs when there is indications
of cyber attack in order to provide cyber threat intelligence. Therefore, over
the past few years, several researchers proposed solutions for collaborative
data sharing, mostly based on existing cryptographic algorithms. However,
the existing approaches are not appropriate for conditional data sharing, i.e.,
sharing the data if and only if a pre-defined condition is satisfied due to the
occurrence of an event. Moreover, in case the existing solutions are used in
conditional data sharing scenarios, the shared secret will be revealed to all
parties and re-keying process is necessary. In this work, in order to address
the aforementioned challenges, we propose, a “conditional collaborative pri-
vate data sharing” protocol based on Identity-Based Encryption and Thresh-
old Secret Sharing schemes. In our proposed approach, the condition based
on which the encrypted data will be revealed to the collaborating parties
(or a central entity) could be of two types: (i) threshold, or (ii) pre-defined
policy. Supported by thorough analytical and experimental analysis, we show
the effectiveness and performance of our proposal.
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1 Introduction
New generation networking paradigms, such as Cloud, have made data shar-
ing between individuals or organizations easier and simpler than ever before.
However, preserving confidentiality and privacy of the shared data (which
could be privacy sensitive) is an important and challenging issue in such net-
works. This issue becomes more significant with regards to distributed sys-
tems, in which different systems might have their own access control policies
for the shared data. Therefore, providing an intelligent private data sharing
method that allows the involved parties to decide when, to whom, and to
what extent they should share their private data is important [9, 13].
Over the past few years, collaborative data sharing has attracted atten-
tion of governments, academia, and industry, due to a multitude of real-world
applications of such a data sharing need. For example, consider the promo-
tion of cyber threat information sharing announced by the US government
in 2015 [16]: “In order to address cyber threats to public health and safety,
national security, and economic security of the United States, private compa-
nies, nonprofit organizations, executive departments and agencies, and other
entities must be able to share information related to cybersecurity risks and
incidents and collaborate to respond in as close to real time as possible”. As
another example, consider large-scale disaster recovery scenarios, such as the
WannaCry worldwide ransomware attack in May 2017. In such a scenario,
several crisis information systems belonged to different organizations need to
share their private data in order to provide Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI)
to take timely actions [8]. It should be noted that, though in these (and other
similar) scenarios, collaborative data sharing is necessary, at the same time,
preserving privacy of individuals, and confidentiality of the business data is
also important [16]. Therefore, an intelligent and secure privacy-preserving
conditional data sharing method should be in place in order to ensure the
confidentiality and accuracy of the shared data.
Motivation and Related Work
Recently, researchers have paid more attention to the secure data sharing
issue, and proposed various cryptographical or non-cryptographical solutions
for private data sharing. This ranges from (just to mention a few) cyberse-
curity [13], smart metering [10], cloud computing [25], cross project defect
prediction [29] and statistical data analysis [24], to online social networks [17].
Most of them basically preserve privacy of shared data by applying different
methods such as data aggregation [24], anonymization [11], obfuscation [29],
multi-party computation [10, 13], or proxy re-encryption [18, 22, 27]. We be-
lieve that the existing data sharing methods have two limitations: (1) Scala-
bility: they are not scalable in terms of number of datasets, i.e., if the data
owner wants to selectively restrict access of other entities to different sets of
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encrypted data, he should perform several key agreement procedures with all
the other entities for each dataset. (2) Conditionality: they do not support
conditional data disclosure, i.e., the scenarios in which the collaborating en-
tities are willing to disclose only a specific set of encrypted data if and only if
a certain condition holds (e.g., entities identify indications of a global cyber
attack).
Moreover, recently some researchers proposed game–theoretic approaches [19,
20]. They consider a game between the attackers and the defenders, based on
which they decide the collaboration strategy between different parties. The
difference between our solution and game-theoric methods is that we consider
a scenario in which the collaborating entities “must” share a specific piece
of data due to a previous agreement. However, all the collaborating entities
might not be available at the same time. In such a scenario, our solution will
help other entities to access that piece of data, while we preserve confiden-
tiality of other parts of the dataset. Therefore, the data owner has granular
control on the amount of data that is shared in emergency situation.
Running example: In order to elaborate more on the problem definition
and the importance of scalability and conditionality issues, let us make a
small example of a cyber attack scenario. Consider a hierarchical banking
system (see Figure 1): in the first (highest) level, there is the country’s central
governmental bank, whose main role is to provide financial, statistical, and
advisory services to all banks in the country. In the second level (Bank A to
Bank M in Figure 1), the central offices of all different independent banks
that exist in a country. In the third (lowest) level (Bank A.1 to Bank A.n in
Figure 1), each bank has a large number of branches in all cities (though we
could consider another fourth level for classifying the branches based on the
cities, for simplicity we ignore this level). It is normal to imagine that all the
branches of one bank share their private data (possibly encrypted) with the
central office of the corresponding bank (i.e., entities of the third level share
the encrypted data with their parent entity in the second level). This data
could be, monetary or non-monetary (e.g., system logs of the users accessing
the PCs in each branch). Moreover, due to some reasons (e.g., country-wide
cyber attack to banking system) central office of each bank (e.g., Bank A)
might need to share its own private data with other banks (Bank B to Bank M
in the second level in Figure 1), and/or with the central governmental bank
(in the first level). In such a scenario, if Bank A releases its encrypted system
log and the secret key for its decryption to the other entities at the same time,
as soon as reception of the encrypted private data, other parties will be able
to decrypt the data (which is not desirable due to confidentiality and privacy
concerns). In fact, all banks wish to share their sensitive data if and only if a
specific event happens, e.g., they recognize that they are under global attack.
In such a situation, Bank A will have two options: (i) to share the encrypted
data, but keep the secret key unless it recognizes the occurrence of an event;
or (ii) to share both the encrypted data and the secret after occurrence of the
event. However, both cases impose delay and are not efficient in emergency
4 Giuseppe Bianchi, Tooska Dargahi, Alberto Caponi, and Mauro Conti
situations. Moreover, considering the fact that each bank might have several
different datasets (e.g., security logs, financial reports, software update logs,
etc.), for each dataset it requires to consider a secret key and perform a key
sharing procedure with all the other entities. Otherwise, in case of considering
just one secret key for all the datasets, other entities will have access to other
datasets that Bank A is not actually willing to share.
Fig. 1: Simple overview of the system model
In such scenarios, a scalable, and easy to deploy secret sharing method
is required, such that it is independent from the number of involved entities
and number of released datasets. A possible solution for the scalability chal-
lenge could be utilization of the Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [15], or
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [6] that allow the data owner to specify the
data decryptors based on their specific attributes or identities, respectively.
However, the conditionality challenge is still unsolved, and to the best of
our knowledge there is no solution in the literature (except our preliminary
work [3,4] that are solutions for specific networking use cases and we extend
them in the current work).
Contribution
In order to address the aforementioned two challenges, in this work, we pro-
pose a conditional collaborative private data sharing protocol that provides
a scalable and easy to deploy cryptographical method for data sharing sce-
narios. In particular, in order to deal with the “scalability” challenge, our
proposal enables the data owner to encrypt each dataset with a unique secret
key. Therefore, the disclosure of one dataset does not disclose information
about the other datasets. We remove the requirement of key management
between different parties by translating the pre-defined conditions for the
authorized entities to an access policy, in particular access matrix. Based on
this pre-defined access matrix, the participating entities in the data sharing
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process (which we call them collaborating entities) construct their own share
of a master secret s. We use a distributed key generation scheme proposed by
Pedersen [28], to construct the unique shared master secret s (which is not
disclosed to any entity) out of the entities’ shares. The only required coordi-
nation between the collaborating entities should take place just once during
the global setup phase, in which the entities decide on the dataset name that
they are going to generate (we do not consider any limitation on the number
of datasets that could be produced).
In order to cope with the “conditionality” challenge, we provide crypto-
graphically conditioning by permitting the collaborating entities to decrypt
a specific dataset only if they satisfy the pre-defined policy and recover the
relevant secret key. We apply a fully distributed process by adopting a com-
bination of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [6], and Linear Secret Sharing
(LSS) [2] (in particular, Threshold Secret Sharing [31]). Our approach permits
the reconstruction of the secret key for each dataset (i.e., for each identity)
only when the provided shares of the relevant cryptographic material satisfy
the pre-defined access policy. The pre-defined policy could be either a thresh-
old number of collaborating entities (e.g., if at least three banks in level two
of the hierarchy in Figure 1 report that they are under attack), or reception
of the shares from specific entities (e.g., if 〈Bank A AND Bank C 〉 report
they are under attack; or if the central governmental bank signals an attack).
In our preliminary work [3, 4], we proposed conditional data sharing so-
lutions for specific use case scenarios. In this paper, we extend our previous
work and provide a comprehensive solution for conditional data sharing which
could be: (i) threshold-based, or (ii) based on a specific access policy due to
the network designer’s choice. Moreover, we provide a security discussion in
which we consider several attack models and discuss the resilience of our
proposal against each of them. In addition, we enhance the security of our
original proposal to cope with cheating entities on the shared secret, which
we did not address in our previous work. We modified our initial proposal by
permitting each party participating in the setup protocol to explicitly verify
each (fraction of) share received during the protocol setup. We also provide a
new use case example in order to show the applicability of our proposed ap-
proach to diverse real-world scenarios. Our new use case focuses on intelligent
sharing and analysis of cyber threat information and indicators of compro-
mise (IoCs), in particular Ransomware threat intelligence (Section 4.1). In
this new use case, each individual device in an organization (e.g., personal
computers in university offices, computers in each branch of a bank, or a hos-
pital) plays the role of a collaborating entity. Each device stores logs (e.g.,
activity on the files, user login, network traffic, contacted IP addresses) based
on a specific index, and stores an encrypted version of the log in a shared
database (though it can be saved locally on the user’s system in a shared
folder). Upon receiving an indication of a cyber attack, the admin of the sys-
tem (e.g., in Figure 1 nodes in the first or second level could be considered as
the admin or the authority) should have access to all the encrypted logs in
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order to perform analysis of the attack entry point, and in some cases it might
be possible to prevent malware spreading on network shares by investigating
the vulnerable points extracted from the security logs.
2 Models and Priliminaries
In this section we describe our considered system model (Section 2.1), and
attack model (Section 2.2), and we explain the assumptions that will be used
in the remainder of the paper. Moreover, we provide relevant background
information (Section 2.3) about the cryptographical tools that we utilize in
the proposed approach. Table 1 reports the notations that we use in this
paper.
Table 1: Notation table.
Notation Description
Ei Collaborating entities, i = {1, ..., n}
IDj Unique identifier of the target Tj
Di,j → {Ei, IDj} Dataset stored by Ei for the target IDj
Ki,j = PRF (Si, IDj)
Secret key used by Ei to encrypt the dataset related
to target IDj , using random secret Si
EIDj Identity based encryption using the IDj as identity
s Unique shared master secret key
gs Global public key associated to the s
H(IDj)
s IBE private key of the target IDj
H(IDj)
xi
Ei’s share of the IBE private key associated to the
target IDj
H Cryptographic hash function
A Access Structure
F Finite field
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2.1 System Model
Figure 2 shows a simple overview of the considered system model. We con-
sider a set of n independent entities E = {E1, ..., En}, each of which being
recognizable by a unique name or identity. We assume that each entity Ei
dynamically logs information about each possible target Tj from a set of
targets. Note that we do not consider any limit on the number of tracked
targets and so no limit for j. Targets are identifiable by a unique identifier
IDj , and choice of the targets is application-dependent, e.g., in the “running
example” in Section 1, a target could be a daily Security Log of a system.
The discussion about how a target could be specified is out of the scope of
the paper. The target identifier could be any pre-defined string, such as Se-
curity.evtx in our running example. We also assume that each Ei stores at
most one unique dataset Di,j for each target identifier IDj (i.e., each Di,j
is identifiable by a pair {Ei, IDj}). In our model, we do not assume any a
priori agreement between the entities on the targets that they are going to
track (i.e., the datasets that they are going to generate), but we assume that
datasets/targets are identifiable through their (global) unique identifier IDj
known by all the entities.
Fig. 2: Simple overview of the system model
Data Sharing Model:
As it can be seen in Figure 2, we assume that entities store their “encrypted”
datasets in a shared repository, we call it Repo. In fact, following [3,4], the use
of shared repository is just for presentation simplicity and is not necessary.
Instead, the collaborating entities can broadcast their encrypted datasets,
which obviously will impose communication overhead, though this choice is
application-dependent and does not hinder our proposal. We assume that the
stored data in the Repo is organized based on two indices: i) Target identifier,
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IDj , as primary index, and ii) Entity name (or identifier), Ei, as secondary
index (see top left part of Figure 2).
Moreover, we assume that symmetric (e.g., AES [1]) and asymmetric (e.g.,
IBE [6]) encryption algorithms, as well as Threshold Secret Sharing [31], and
Pedersen key generation [28] schemes are available in the system to be used
by the entities. Therefore, we consider each entity Ei to encrypt the content of
each dataset Di,j , for target identity IDj , using a fast symmetric encryption
method (e.g., AES). To do so, Ei uses a distinct key Ki,j per dataset that
is only known by the entity Ei itself, and is computed using the following
function:
Ki,j = PRF (Si, IDj), (1)
where Si is a random secret chosen by Ei, and PRF is a secure pseudo-
random function. We consider such a key derivation method in order to enable
entities to compute per target keys on-the-fly without the need for complex
stateful key management methods. Then, each entity sends an IBE-encrypted
version of the target-specific key, i.e., EIDj (Ki,j), to the shared repository.
Furthermore, we assume the Pedersen key generation scheme [28] will be
used in the system in order to construct a unique shared master secret s
(which is not disclosed to any entity). And each target Tj with identity IDj
will be associated with an IBE private key H(IDj)
s, where H is a crypto-
graphic hash function mapping the IDj into a point of a cyclic group Gp.
Each entity Ei is able to compute its own share of the master secret s, the
global public key gs, as well as its share of the IBE private key associated to
each target, i.e., H(IDj)
xi , where xi is the local per party share (for more
details on xi refer to Section 3.1). All the details regarding the key generation
and sharing is explained in Section 3.
Data Disclosure Model:
Every entity in our model is in charge of evaluating its own status and corre-
spondingly deciding when to share the credentials related to one (or more) of
its targets, by triggering a “disclosure signal”. In particular, when an entity
Ei decides to disclose its dataset Di,j on the target identity IDj , it sends
its own share, H(IDj)
xi , of the IBE private key associated to target IDj .
When the Repo receives required number of private key shares for target IDj
which satisfy the pre-defined access policy on Tj , it will be able to reconstruct
the H(IDj)
s and access all the datasetes related to target IDj generated by
all the entities (as we detail in Section 3). This way, we guarantee that the
encrypted datasets will be disclosed “if and only if” the pre-defined condition
is satisfied, and neither the shared Repo, not the colluding entities are able
to access the datasets.
Intelligent Conditional Collaborative Private Data Sharing 9
To elaborate more on this matter consider our running example (see Fig-
ure 1). Each bank in the third level (e.g., Bank Ai where i ∈ {1..n}) is in
charge of assessing its local security status and storing system Security Log.
Each Ai upon recognizing an attack indicator, triggers a “disclosure signal”
and sends its own share of the secret related to its encrypted Security Log
(which is identified by Security.evtx identifier) to a high level correspond-
ing authority or repository (e.g., Bank A, or even the central bank). Upon
reception of sufficient number of key shares on the Security.evtx by the col-
laborating entities, the Repo will be able to recover the IBE private key
associated to the Security.evtx and access the Security Log of all the collab-
orating banks. Obviously, if an entity Ek (for any reason) does not gather
information about a target Tj , will neither send corresponding dataset Dk,j
to the Repo, nor participate in the disclosure policy of Tj dataset.
2.2 Attack Model
In our attack model, we consider two types of attackers: external and internal
attackers. (i) External attackers are the external entities that do not collabo-
rate in our protocol. We consider this adversary as a weak attacker, since the
only capability of the attacker is eavesdropping the communication between
the collaborating entities, and between the entities and the shared repository.
A secure protocol against external attacker should not leak any information
to the eavesdropper. (ii) In contrary, we consider the internal attackers to be
strong attackers and our main focus in this work is to strengthen the security
of the proposed scheme against these attackers.
We consider the internal attacker to be of four types, as we explain in the
following.
(1) Untrusted shared repository: We consider the shared repository to be un-
trusted. Therefore, it attempts to gain information about the encrypted
datasets that it receives from the entities. A desirable secure protocol
should be resistance against this adversary, i.e., a security requirement
is that the shared repository “must not” be able to decrypt any of the
datasets unless the disclosure condition (the pre-defined policy) is met by
the entities.
(2) Honest-but-curious collaborating entities: We assume the collaborating
entities to be honest-but-curious adversaries, meaning that they honestly
follow the protocol (as we will explain in Section 3) in generating their own
shares of a secret and distributing the required public parameters. How-
ever, they are curious to obtain information about other entities’ dataset on
the same or different targets. To elaborate more on this attacker consider
Figure 2. Assume that E1 has two datasets D1,1 and D1,2 on the targets
with ID1 and ID2, respectively. Moreover, E2 has stored two datasets
D2,1 and D2,3 on the targets with ID1 and ID3, respectively. Now assume
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that E1 is “curious” to access the data stored in D2,1 and D2,3. In this
example, E1 and E2 both track the target ID1. So, a possible attack from
E1 on D2,1 is to use its own secret on ID1 to have unauthorized access to
the D2,1. Another possible attack from E1 to D2,3, is as follows: assume
that the entities agreed to reveal the dataset related to ID1. Now, E1 tries
to use the revealed share of the E2’s secret to gain information about the
D2,3.
Therefore, two security requirements regarding this attacker are: (a) two
entities who track the same target “must not” be able to access each
other’s dataset unless the disclosure condition is met; (b) the disclosure of
one dataset “must not” reveal any information about another dataset.
(3) Colluding entities: As the third attack, we consider a set of entities where
each of them does not satisfy a dataset disclosure’s condition per se. Hence,
they collude with each other to satisfy the disclosure policy (e.g., by send-
ing a false “disclosure signal”) in order to have unauthorized access to other
entities’ datatset. Now, we have two scenarios: (a) the colluding entities do
not satisfy the disclosure policy, and (b) the colluding entities satisfy the
disclosure policy. Therefore, security requirement related to this attacker
is: a set of colluding entities “must not” be able to access information
about the dataset and the master secret s.
(4) Cheating entity on the secret: The last attacker that we consider is an
internal entity that sends a fake/altered shares of the secret secret as
its share to the Repo (or other entities) to avoid letting disclosure of its
dataset. Therefore, the security requirement is that “no” collaborating
entity can submit an incorrect share of a secret.
2.3 Background on the Cryptographic Algorithms
In the proposed scheme, we take advantage of Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE), and Linear Secret Sharing (LSS) schemes. In the following we provide
required background knowledge on these two schemes.
2.3.1 Identity-Based Encryption
Identity-Based Encryption proposed by Boneh and Franklin [6,7] is a public
key encryption that allows the data owner to encrypt the data using an
arbitrary string, ID, (as the public key). This way, any pair of users are able
to securely communicate without exchanging any key materials (i.e., public
and private keys), and without the need to involve any trusted third party
for the key management purpose.
An IBE scheme is composed of four functions [7]:
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• Setup: takes as input a security parameter; and outputs a set of system
public parameters, P, and a private master key, MK, that is known only
by the key generator. The system public parameters include a description
of a finite message spaceM, and a description of a finite ciphertext space
C.
• Extract: takes as input P, the master key MK, and an arbitrary string
ID ∈ {0, 1}∗; and outputs a private key SK. In particular, this function
takes the ID as a public key, and extracts the corresponding private key
SK.
• Encrypt: takes as input P, an ID, and a message m ∈ M; and outputs
a ciphertext CT ∈ C.
• Decrypt: takes as input P, a ciphertext CT , and a private key SK; and
outputs the message m.
In an IBE scheme, if SK is a private key that is generated by the Ex-
tract algorithm for the string ID as the public key, then the corresponding
encryption and decryption functions must satisfy the following consistency
constraint:
∀m ∈M : Decrypt(P, CT, SK) = m where CT = Encrypt(P, ID,m)
2.3.2 Linear Secret Sharing
Secret sharing scheme, first introduced by Shamir [31] as threshold secret
sharing, is a building block for several cryptographic methods and secure
protocols, such as attribute-based encryption, and multiparty computation.
In a (t, n) “threshold” secret sharing scheme [31], a dealer who has a secret
s, divides the secret into n pieces and distributes shares of his secret to n
parties. Any subset of parties whose cardinality is greater or equal to a pre-
defined threshold, t (where 1 ≤ t ≤ n), can reconstruct the s from its shares.
However, knowledge of any t− 1 or less shares of the secret reveals “no” in-
formation about the s. A generalization of the threshold secret sharing would
be distributing the shares of s based on an access structure A (i.e., a subset
of parties). Such a secret sharing scheme satisfies the following conditions [2]:
i) Correctness: any subset of A (authorized parties) can reconstruct the se-
cret from its shares; and ii) Perfect privacy: any subset of parties that is not
in A (unauthorized parties) cannot gain any information about the secret.
A “linear” secret sharing scheme (LSSS) is defined over a finite field F. The
dealer chooses a secret which is an element of the F, and the shares of the
secret are vectors over F. The shares are computed using some independent
random field elements (chosen by the dealer) while applying a linear mapping
to the secret [2].
12 Giuseppe Bianchi, Tooska Dargahi, Alberto Caponi, and Mauro Conti
3 Proposed Approach
Our proposal for conditional collaborative data sharing composed of two
phases: 1) offline setup phase, and 2) online credential and dataset man-
agement. The main difference between our proposal and the state-of-the-art
LSSS [2] that might be considered by a layman reader as a similar approach for
collaborative data sharing is the “conditionality” requirement. This require-
ment, as we explained in Section 1 and Section 2 (second attacker model), is
that disclosure of a dataset related to target identifier IDj must not reveal
any information related to any other target identifier IDk. Therefore, our
proposal is different from the state-of-the-art in that, in our approach we
consider unique dynamic keys for each target (adopting IBE [6,7]), that can
be defined at runtime. Further, such keys will be mixed with exiting secret
sharing schemes in order to provide distributed collaborative data sharing.
We explain the details in the following.
3.1 Offline Setup
In the setup phase, the participating entities, Ei where i ∈ {1..n}, share a
secret according to the considered access structure A. The entities agree on
the following public parameters:
• Two large primes p and q such that q divides p− 1;
• An m× ` access matrix1 A on the participating entities, representing the
specified policy to access the secret;
• A cyclic group Gp of prime order p, and a generator g ∈ Gp for the group.
The group Gp is specifically chosen as the domain of a non degenerative
bilinear map e : Gp ×Gp → GT .
Then, each party Ei performs the following steps:
1. Chooses a random secret σi ∈ Zq over the ring of integers modulo prime
q;
2. Chooses a random vector vi ∈ Z`q with σi as first entry;
3. For each access matrix row j, computes the share wi,j = Aj ·vi, and sends
(through a secure unicast) it to party associated to the row j;
4. Computes gσi ∈ Gp, and broadcasts it to all entities.
After all, none of the entities knows the shared master secret s, where
s =
∑n
i=1 σi. Rather, each entity is able to compute the following important
quantities:
1 In general, depending on the access structure, m can be greater than the number of
domains n (i.e., an entity may require to be given multiple shares for satisfying the access
policy). Here, for presentation simplicity we non restrictively consider m = n.
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• The global public key gs =
∏n
i=1 g
σi ∈ Gp;
• The local per entity share xj =
∑n
i=1 wi,j ∈ Zq.
The system is secure as long as the master secret s remains unknown to all
the involved parties. In essence, the master secret will never be reconstructed,
and we will reconstruct quantities of type H(IDj)s, namely identity based
private keys associated to target identity H(IDj).
3.2 Online Credential and Dataset Management
Monitoring a new target: We recall that an entity Ei encrypts its dataset
associated to a target IDj , using a pseudo-random key Ki,j on-the-fly gen-
erated according to (1). Each entity upon deciding to generate a dataset
regarding a target Tj , with identity IDj , must deliver suitable cryptographic
information to the shared repository for decrypting the dataset. In order to
do so, Ei transmits once-for-all to the Repo (or once everytime it changes its
own secret Si used in Equation (1) an IBE-encrypted version EIDj (Ki,j) of
the key Ki,j . The EIDj (Ki,j) is constructed using the IBE method [6], where
the identity (IBE public key) is the string IDj , and the PKG’s public key is
the gs that is computed in the offline setup phase (Section 3.1). The adopted
IBE equation is as follows:
EIDj (Ki,j) = (gr,Ki,k ⊕H2(e(H(IDj)r, gs))) (2)
where r ∈ Zq is a random value, e : Gp × Gp → GT is the agreed bilinear
map, H : {0, 1}∗ → Gp is a cryptographic hash mapping a target name IDj
into a point of the group Gp, and H2 : GT → {0, 1}h is a cryptographic hash
mapping a point of the group GT into a string of same size as Ki,j .
Dataset disclosure: Whenever an entity Ei, desires to share its dataset
related to the target identity IDj with the other entities, it generates a
disclosure signal as follows:
Signali,j = H(IDj)
xi ∈ Gp (3)
Upon reception of a sufficient number of shares (satisfying the access pol-
icy) delivered inside the signals Signali,j for IDj , the repo computes the
coefficient ci such that ∑
i∈Q
ci ·Ai = (1, 0, ..., 0) (4)
where Q is the set of secret shares for the target IDj received from the
entities, and Ai is the row of the access matrix associated to the secret share
disclosed by the entity Ei. Having sufficient number of secret shares and
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their corresponding coefficients, the Repo can reconstruct the IBE private
key associated to the target IDj , i.e., H(IDj)
s as follows:
H(IDj)
s=
∏
i∈Q
signalcii,k=
∏
i∈Q
H(IDj)
cixi =H(IDj)
∑
i∈Q cixi (5)
Finally, all the IBE-encrypted keysK∗,j , used to encrypt each entities dataset,
can be decrypted by computing
H2(e(H(IDj)
s, gr)) (6)
Due the properties of bilinear pairings, we have
H2(e(H(IDj)
s, gr)) = H2(e(H(IDj)
r, gs)), (7)
Considering the Equation (2), we can now recover all the keys (i.e., K∗,j):
Ki,j ⊕H2(e(H(IDj)r, gs))⊕H2(e(H(IDj)s, gr)) = Ki,j (8)
The keys K∗,j now can be used to decrypt all the datasets associated to the
target IDj . Hence, even the dataset of the entities that have not decided to
share their dataset and have not sent the relevant Signal can be decrypted
(due to satisfying the pre-defined access policy during the offline setup phase).
3.3 Security Discussion
In this section, we provide a security analysis of our proposed approach
against the considered attack model in Section 2.2. First, considering an
external attacker, eavesdropping could be easily eliminated by assuming a
secure communication channel between each pair of entities, and between an
entity and the shared repository. Therefore, our proposed approach is safe
against such an attacker.
Regarding an internal attacker and considered four types of attacks (refer
to Section 2.2), we discuss the resilience of our proposed approach against
each of these attacks in the following.
3.3.1 Untrusted shared repository
Due to the usage of IBE for encrypting the datasets based on their target
identifier (i.e., per IDj), for each dataset we have a unique IBE private key,
H(IDj)
s. The shared repository (Repo) would only be able to decrypt the
datasets if either the s is disclosed, or H(IDj)
s has been reconstructed as a
whole. On the one hand, as we explained earlier, the master secret s will never
be reconstructed, and the Repo will not have access to the s. On the other
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hand, if the shares of the IBE private key, H(IDj)
xi , that the Repo receives
do not satisfy the access policy, the Repo would not be able to recover the
H(IDj)
s. This feature is due to the usage of LSSS for sharing the master
secret s between the collaborating parties. Therefore, the shared repository
is not able to decrypt the datasets unless a sufficient number of entities send
their shares of the IBE private key; hence the proposed approach meets the
security requirements related to an “untrusted shared repository” attack.
3.3.2 Honest-but-curious collaborating entities
In Section 2.2 we defined two security requirements. (a) considering any sub-
set Ω′ of the entities (unauthorized parties) that are not involved in the
dataset disclosure access policy, should not be able to gain any information
about the secret [2]. This requirement is satisfied due to the usage of LSSS.
Therefore, a malicious entity cannot access other entity’s share and datasets
unless the disclosure condition is met.
(b) Based on the features of IBE [6], it follows that the disclosure of the
IBE private key H(IDj)
s associated to a target IDj does not reveal any
information about the remaining targets.
3.3.3 Colluding entities
In Section 2.2 we considered two different scenarios. First case is a set Ω′ of
colluding entities that do not satisfy the disclosure policy. In this case, the
outcome of their collusion will be a key s′ =
∑
i∈Ω′ c
′
ix
′
i, which would be s
′ =
s+ε and could not be used to decrypt the dataset. In the second case, in which
the colluding entities “satisfy” the disclosure policy on a dataset, they will
obviously be able to reconstruct the H(IDj)
s and decrypt the corresponding
dataset.
3.3.4 Cheating entity on the secret
In this section, we focus on cheating parties who aim to break the protocol
by delivering fake/altered shares during the crucial offline setup operation2
(described in Section 3.1). We show that how our proposed system could be
further improved to cope with this kind of attack. Note that such an attacker
2 Note that fake shares are critical only during the offline setup operation. Indeed, a
party wishing to cheat during the online operation, i.e., sending a fake signal H(IDj)
xi
in Equation (3), would be considered as a party who “refuses” to send her share. In other
words, knowing that a signal is fake does not solve the problem of disclosing a target
dataset - in any case the dataset would be decrypted only when a sufficient number of
valid signals (Equation (3)) are received.
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may play havoc with the proposed protocol. Undetected injection of fake
shares wi,j -with reference to the notation introduced in Section 3.1- by a
party i would affect all of the local per-entity shares xj that are built upon
such fake shares. In this case, it will be impossible to reconstruct the key for
any target dataset as detailed in Section 3.2.
A possible solution against such an attacker would be extending the pro-
tocol by permitting each party participating in the setup phase to explicitly
verify each (fraction of the) share received during the setup. Then, each
party could follow up with its own local share computation only when the
correctness of the received information is guaranteed. This goal can be ac-
complished by adapting a non-interactive verifiable secret sharing scheme to
our proposed offline setup protocol. To this purpose, in the remainder of this
section we show how a basic solution based on Feldman’s commitments [12]
can be designed. Our proposed approach is simple and perfectly compatible
with the Pedersen Distributed Key Generation scheme [28], but it is more
general than previous proposals restricted to threshold-based secret sharing.
Our proposed solution does not require any special structure or restriction in
the access matrix. We here focus on such a baseline approach and leave exten-
sions to more elaborated zero-knowledge approaches for further work. In fact,
despite some known limitations [14] a Feldman-based commitment within a
distributed Pedersen-type protocol is considered reasonable and, for instance,
it has been employed also for distributing the Private Key Generator in IBE
schemes [7].
Let us first recall, from Section 3.1, that each participating entity Ei
chooses a random secret σi ∈ Zq and a random vector in Z`q , with σi as
the first entry. Let us denote such a vector as
vi = [σi, r2,i, · · · , rl,i].
With such a notation, the computation of the share wi,j for each access matrix
row j can be rewritten as
wi,j = a1,jσi +
l∑
k=2
ak,j · rk,i
The offline setup phase, described in Section 3.1, now requires each partici-
pating entity Ei to compute and broadcast c1,i = g
σi ∈ Gp. To permit verifia-
bility of the shares wi,j , each party Ei have to further compute and broadcast
the additional l − 1 commitments ck,i = grk,i ∈ Gp, for all k = 2, · · · l.
The participating entity Ei is now given the possibility to verify that the
above computed share wi,j associated to row j of the access matrix is indeed
a valid share, by checking whether the following equality holds:
l∏
k=1
c
ak,j
k
?
= gwi,i
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In fact, if the protocol is correctly executed and no shares are altered, it
readily follows that:
l∏
k=1
c
ak,j
k = (g
σi)
a1,j ·
l∏
k=2
(grk,i)
ak,j = g(a1,jσi+
∑l
k=2 ak,j ·rk,i) = gwi,i . (9)
Otherwise, if the Equation 9 does not hold, it means that one (or more)
of the collaborating entities has shared a fake/altered share of the secret.
4 Use Case Example
In this section we explain two use case scenarios for which we adopt our
proposed conditional collaborative data sharing approach. As we discuss in
Section 4.1, during a global or large scale cyber attack scenario, intelligently
sharing the threat feeds provides security analysts with threat intelligence.
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) helps security analysts, victims, and defend-
ers to gain knowledge about adversaries, their intentions and methods [21].
This knowledge is achieved by processing the shared information regarding
the Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), e.g., through sharing system logs, secu-
rity alerts, network traffic information, and so on [30]. An important challenge
in the area of CTI is legal issues regarding the sharing of CTI-related infor-
mation, specially the information within the government’s possession and
within the possession of the private sector [26]. As an example, assume a sce-
nario in which Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides the privately
owned banks with the IP addresses that are known to deliver ransomware to
financial sector [26], or an infected bank provides such information to other
banks.
The second use case (in Section 4.2) is borrowed from our previous work [3],
in which we show how the proposed approach helps in mitigating a distributed
denial of service attack through whitelisting legitimate traffic.
4.1 Ransomware Threat Intelligence
In order to make this use case more clear let us consider the WannaCry Ran-
somware attack, that emerged in May 2017. WannaCry exploited a vulnera-
bility in Windows machines (Windows SMB remote code execution vulnera-
bility) and was able to spread itself across an organization’s network without
user intervention [32]. We believe that it would be possible to mitigate the
WannaCry attack (and similar worm-like malwares) and block its spreading
throughout an organization’s network by sharing the attack indicators and
system logs within the organization (and with different organizations).
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Fig. 3: System log (i.e., IoCs regarding a ransomware attack) sharing
In this use case, we consider two scenarios: 1)a fine-grained data sharing
scenario, in which each individual device in an organization, e.g., personal
computers in wards of a hospital, in each office of a department in a uni-
versity, or in each branch of a bank, is considered as a collaborating entity
(e.g., Figure 3). In this scenario, each device stores logs (e.g., network traf-
fic, or application information) based on a specific index (which should be
agreed a priori). For example, each device logs the requested DNS resolution,
or contacted websites, or list of software updates. Moreover, there is usually
a central logging database that stores an encrypted version of the logs of
each device (though it can be saved locally on the user’s system in a shared
folder). Upon receiving an indication of a cyber attack, the security analyst
of an organization should have access to all the encrypted logs in order to
perform analysis of the attack entry point. For example, having access to the
contacted IP addresses by each device in an organization, the analyst might
be able to detect the Command and Control (C2) server which the malware
connects to, and blacklist the IP address. However, considering a university
example, all the staff and professors may not wish to share their private
information on their activities, e.g., contacted web sites. In the WannaCry
attack scenario, this havoc happened for those computers that were using
outdated/unpatched Windows. While, if at the first point of recognizing the
indicators of compromise, the first victim (or a number of initial victims) had
shared the vulnerability and attack information within their organization, or
with other organizations, it could be possible to search for those vulnera-
bilities and mitigate it before being distributed through the organization’s
network.
2)A coarse-grained data sharing scenario: in which each private hospital,
each department in a university, or each private bank plays the role of a col-
laborating entity (e.g., Figure 4). Our proposed private data sharing method
is of great help in such scenarios. Imagine each hospital in a city or coun-
try being an entity. All of the hospitals log their security related information
(e.g., alerts, DNS requests, software patches, etc) and store an encrypted copy
of them in a shared repository. Moreover, assume that the dataset disclosure
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Fig. 4: Ransomware threat data sharing in large scale scenario
condition is that at least two hospitals trigger the Signal alert. Upon recogni-
tion of an attack, E2 and E3 in Figure 4 trigger the data disclosure Signal. As
soon as receiving sufficient number of Signals, the admin of the shared repos-
itory is able to recover the encryption key and access the logged information
by all the entities. In fact, Equation 8 which leads to disclosure of all the K∗,j
keys regarding a target IDj (recalling that a target could be any of these logs
which is identifiable through a unique public index) provides an important
feature for emergency scenarios. This is useful in situations where the log of
all the hospitals should be investigated (for vulnerability analysis against the
ransomware attack), while some of the hospitals have not detected an attack
(e.g., E1 in Figure 4), or their IT manager (or whoever responsible) is not
available to share their credentials, or for any reason (which could be privacy
issues) they are not able/willing to share their logged information. In such a
scenario, in order to mitigate a large scale cyber attack, and due to the fact
that the disclosure policy has been agreed by all the participating entities
(i.e., hospitals) during the initial setup, the unavailability or unwillingness
of some entities does not matter, since the shared repository will be able to
access those information for further investigation.
4.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attack Mitigation
In this use case example we consider a DDoS mitigation approach through
establishing and sharing whitelists of good addresses that should not be fil-
tered under DDoS attack conditions. Figure 5 shows an example scenario
in which the target has been considered to be a web server, identifiable by
its unique name. Each domain generates a whitelist for any target that it
is willing to monitor. Each whitelist includes a set of IP addresses of be-
nign users whose access to the target server should be guaranteed even in
the presence of a DDoS attack. However, whitelists require domains to share
sensible information. Our proposed approach helps in managing a large num-
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Fig. 5: DDoS mitigation via whitelist example
ber of fine-grained organized whitelists and selectively disclose them under
precisely specified attack conditions.
Whenever a domain Ei, based on its internal monitoring of a target IDj ,
detects that the target is under DDoS attack, it triggers the disclosure signal
and shares its own share of the private key associated to the target IDj .
When “sufficient” number of Signals which satisfy the access policy (e.g.,
〈E1 ∧E3〉 ∨E2) is received, all the domains involved in the system operation
will be able to retrieve (i.e., decrypt) all the whitelists associated to the target
IDj , and will be able to instruct their
firewalls accordingly (e.g., block all traffic except the whitelisted IP ad-
dresses).
5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of our approach bor-
rowed from our previous work [3]. As our proposal is mostly a cryptographic
approach and its performance assessment highly relates to specific applica-
tion scenario, in this section we present the computational time required to
perform each cryptographic primitive. The performance evaluation is per-
formed on an Intel Xeon X5650 (2.67 GHz, 6 cores) equipped with 16 GB
RAM and an Ubuntu Server operating system. We implemented the system
using C++ programming language. We adopted XML to structure and trans-
port exported data between different entities. For cryptographic operations
(e.g., hashing with SHA-256, symmetric encryption/decryption with AES-
128 ) we used the OpenSSL library. For pairings, elliptic curve generation,
elliptic curve arithmetic, and hash functions required by IBE, we adopted
Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library [23].
Even if our current preliminary implementation has not been specifi-
cally optimized for performance and multi-core exploitation, results are very
promising and suggest the feasibility of our system in a realistic setting. Ta-
ble 2 depicts performance analysis of the cryptographic primitives. The re-
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Function Computation Time (ms)
IBE encryption, Equation (2) 2.2051
IBE decryption, Equation (6) 2.3070
Symmetric key derivation, Equation (1) 0.0086
Key share computation, Equation (3) 0.3101
AES-cbc-256 encryption 0.00927
AES-cbc-256 decryption 0.01334
Key Reconstruction, Equation (5) (1 share) 0.35697
Key Reconstruction, Equation (5) (2 shares) 0.98011
Key Reconstruction, Equation (5) (3 shares) 1.18959
Table 2: Cryptographic operation performance analysis
sults are obtained by averaging 1M executions of a same primitive. As it can
be seen, IBE-related operations impose the highest computation overhead,
especially those involving pairings. While, Symmetric encryption of datasets
is the least expensive operation. However, as encryption of datasets should be
performed in real time, it may become a bottleneck. The IBE-related opera-
tions are actually computed only once for every newly considered target IDj
(we assume there is not a periodic rekeying process per target). Similarly, key
reconstruction functions per target should be performed once, only if there is
an ongoing attack. Therefore, the fact that complexity grows with the number
of shares is not an issue. It should be noted that complexity of the proposal
does not rely on the number of entities involved in the system, this will only
affect the initial offline setup phase. While, the number of shares that are
required to satisfy the access policy affects performance of the system. It is
evident that if we consider the threshold-based secret sharing, the increase in
the threshold value (and consequently number of required shares) will lead
to the increase in the complexity of Equation (5) which reconstructs the IBE
private key associated to a target. While, if we consider the policy-based se-
cret sharing, the complexity of Equation (5) depends on the complexity of
the access policy. For example, if we consider a policy ∪i∈NEi, the number of
required shares for key reconstruction would be one; however, if we consider
the following access policy (E1 ∨E2)∧E3 ∧E4 ∧E5, the number of required
shares to reconstruct the key would be four. The performance of our system
also relies on the rate of considering new targets (IDj), since each entity
requires to perform Equation (1) and the IBE encryption (Equation (2)) and
deliver the decryption key to the Repo. However, these operations can be
offloaded and scaled to gbps speed [5].
6 Conclusion
The conditional collaborative private data sharing method proposed in this
paper is a cryptographical method that is applicable to secure privacy-
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preserving collaborative data sharing scenarios. In such scenarios, a priori
known entities would only like to share their encrypted data conditionally
on special occasions, defining uniform access structures. In particular, our
proposed method adopts a combination of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)
and Linear Secret Sharing(LSS) schemes in order to provide scalability, and
efficiency. Our proposal is scalable in the sense that there is no limit on the
number of distinct datasets that each entity is willing to share, since the
datasets are independently encrypted using IBE, and their unique identi
er is the public key. The proposed approach is efficient in the sense that
there is no need for any interaction between different entities on deciding
encryption/decrytion keys for each dataset, as long as they consider a unique
public identifier for each dataset that is publicly available to all the collabora-
tive entities. The important distinguishing feature of the proposed approach
compared to the existing collaborative data sharing methods is that, the mas-
ter secret will never be revealed/reconstructed by any entity or central shared
storage; rather, some quantities of the identity-based private keys associated
to each dataset will be shared and reconstructed by the collaborative enti-
ties. Therefore, disclosure of one dataset Dj , will not reveal any information
about the other datasets with different identifiers (i.e., ID), eliminating the
need for perform re-keying process for other undisclosed datasets.
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